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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
IN CIRCUIT COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to the Utah Constitution Article VIII, Section 3,
and Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(d).
The proceedings below consist of a suit by Plaintiff
Butterfield Lumber, Inc. ("Butterfield")# seeking from Defendants
$4,250.00 plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs based upon
Butterfield's supplying of materials used in the construction of a
residence

on

the

subject

real

property

(the

"Property").

Butterfield's claim against Appellant Peterson Mortgage Corporation
("Peterson Mortgage") was confined to Butterfield's Third Claim for
Relief seeking foreclosure of a mechanics's lien, plus attorneys'
fees and costs.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review on this appeal are as
follows:
A.

Whether a mechanic's lien attaches to the proceeds

from a sale of real property to an innocent third-party purchaser
after the lienor has failed to file a notice of "lis pendens" as
required by Section 38-1-11, U.C.A. (1953), and has thus failed to
preserve the lienor's

"in rem" rights in the real property as

contemplated by Section 38-1-3, U.C.A- (1953)•

1

In deciding whether

the trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law, the
appellate

court

gives

no

construction of a statute.

deference

to

the

trial

court's

Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving,

Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply
Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988).
B.

Whether a recorded notice of lien that was not

properly acknowledged pursuant to Section 57-3-1, U.C.A. (1953), in
effect

at the pertinent time, perfected

contemplated by § 38-1-7, U.C.A. (1953).

a mechanic's

lien as

In deciding whether the

trial court properly denied Peterson Mortgage's Motion to Dismiss
as a matter of law in construing a statute, the appellate court
gives no deference to the trial court's interpretation of the law.
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc., supra; Forbes v. St.
Mark's Hosp., 754 P.2d 933 (Utah 1988).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The determinative constitutional provisions of the Utah
Constitution, and the determinative statutes of the State of Utah
read verbatim as follows:
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 38-1-3.
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons
performing any services or furnishing or
renting any materials or equipment used in the
construction, alteration, or improvement of
any building or structure or improvement to
any premises in any manner and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have
2

furnished
designs,
plats,
plans,
maps,
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost,
surveys or superintendence, or who have
rendered other like professional service, or
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the
property upon or concerning which they have
rendered
service,
performed
labor,
or
furnished or rented materials or equipment for
the value of the service rendered, labor
performed, or materials or equipment furnished
or rented by each respectively, whether at the
instance of the owner or of any other person
acting by his authority as agent, contractor,
or otherwise. This lien shall attach only to
such interest as the owner may have in the
property.
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 38-1-7.
(1) Every original contractor within 100 days
after the completion of his contract, and
except as - provided in this section, every
person other than the original contractor who
claims the benefit of this chapter within 80
days after furnishing the last material or
performing the last labor for or on any land,
building, improvement, or structure shall file
for record with the county recorder of the
county in which the property, or some part of
the property,is situated, a written notice to
hold and claim a lien.
(2) This notice shall contain a statement
setting forth the following information:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if
known or, if not known, the name of the record
owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was
employed or to whom he furnished the material;
(c) the time when the first and last
labor was performed, or the first and last
material was furnished ;
(d) a description of the
sufficient for identification; and
3

property,

(e) the signature of the lien claimant or
his authorized agent, and the date signed*
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of
lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail
by certified mail to either the reputed owner
or record owner of the real property a copy of
the notice of lien*
If the record owner's
current address is not readily available, the
copy of the claim may be mailed to the lastknown address of the record owner, using the
names and addresses appearing on the last
completed real property assessment rolls of
the county where the affected property is
located.
Failure to deliver or mail the
notice of lien to the reputed owner or record
owner precludes the lien claimant from an
award of costs and attorneys' fees against the
reputed owner or record owner in an action to
enforce the lien.
(4) When a subcontractor or any person
furnishes labor or material as stated in
Subsections (1) through (3) at the request of
an original contractor, then the final date
for the filing of a notice of intention to
hold and claim a lien for a subcontractor or a
person furnishing labor or material at the
request of an original contractor is 80 days
after completion of the original contract of
the original contractor.
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 38-1-11.
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided
for must be begun within twelve months after
the completion of the original contract, or
the suspension of work thereunder for a period
of thirty days.
Within the twelve months
herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file
for record with the county recorder of each
county in which the lien is recorded a notices
of the pendency of the action, in the manner
provided in actions affecting the title or
right to possession of real property, or the*
lien shall be void, except as to persons who
have been made parties to the action and
persons
having actual knowledge of
the
commencement of the action, and the burden of
4

proof shall be upon the lien claimant and
those claiming under him to show such actual
knowledge. Nothing herein contained shall be
construed to impair or affect the right of any
person to whom a debt may be due for any work
done or materials furnished to maintain a
personal action to recover the same.
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 57-1-1.
The term "conveyanceM as used in this title
shall be construed to embrace every instrument
in writing by which any real estate r or
interest in real estate, is created# alienedt
mortgaged, encumbered or ^assigned, except
wills i and leases for a term not exceeding one
year.
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 57-2-1.
Every conveyance in writing whereby any real
estate is conveyed or may be affected shall be
acknowledged or proved and certified in the
manner hereinafter provided.
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 57-3-1.
A certificate of the acknowledgment of any
conveyance, or of the proof of the execution
thereof as provided in this title, signed and
certified by the officer taking the same as
provided in this title, shall entitle such
conveyance,
with
the
certificate
or
certificates aforesaid, to be recorded in the
office of the recorder of the county in which
the real estate is situated.
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 57-4a-l.
Each document executed and acknowledged on or
before July 1, 1988, may be recorded in the
office of the county recorder regardless of
any defect or irregularity in its execution,
attestation, or acknowledgment.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Butterfield filed suit April 6, 1988, seeking $4,250.00
plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs based upon Butterfield
supplying materials used in the construction of a residence on the
Property.

Butterfield's

claim

against

Peterson

Mortgage

was

confined to Butterfield's Third Claim for Relief, which sought only
foreclosure

of

Butterfield's

claimed

mechanic's

"Mechanic's Lien"), plus attorneys' fees and costs.

lien

(the

By its Third

Claim for Relief, Butterfield claimed that the Mechanic's Lien had
priority over Peterson Mortgage's trust deed (the "Trust Deed") on
the Property, which Trust Deed had been recorded one hour and 38
minutes after Butterfield first supplied materials

for use in

improving the Property.
Peterson Mortgage filed a timely motion to dismiss (the
"Motion to Dismiss") based upon Butterfield's failure to have its
Notice of Mechanic's Lien (the "Notice") acknowledged cis required
by § 57-3-1

(1953).

The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to its written Decision of June 28, 19 89.
Butterfield then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (the
"Motion for Summary Judgment"), requesting the Court to determine
that

the Lien had

Peterson

Mortgage

priority over

the Trust

to pay Butterfield

Deed

and

the principal

ordering
amount

of

Butterfield's claim, plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs.
Peterson Mortgage opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment because

6

after

that

time

Peterson

Mortgage

owned

no

interest

in

the

Property, Butterfield had failed to file and record a notice of
"lis pendens' with respect to this action, and the Mechanic's Lien
did not attach to any proceeds from the sale of the Property to
anyone.

The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment

pursuant to its written Memorandum Decision of March 1, 1990.
After issuing a subsequent written Memorandum Decision of
June 15,*. 1990, modifying its earlier decision with respect to the
amount of principal, interest and attorneys fees recoverable by
Butterfield from Peterson Mortgage, the trial court entered its
Order and Judgment on July 12, 1990, requiring Peterson Mortgage to
pay

to

Butterfield

the

principal

amount

of

$4,043.80,

plus

interest, attorneys' fees and costs as stated in the Order and
Judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
No
following

genuine

material

issue
facts.

of

fact

All

exists

references

as
in

Appellant are to pages in the record on appeal.

to

any

this

of

Brief

the
of

Copies of the

Decision dated June 28, 1989, Memorandum Decision dated March 1,
1990, Memorandum

Decision dated

June

15, 1990, and Order and

Judgment dated July 12, 1990, are included in the Addendum.
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1»

Butterfield

supplied

building materials

for the

construction of a private residence, whose owner and contractor
failed to pay for the materials.
2.
paid

Neither the owner of the Property nor the contractor

Butterfield

materials.

(Record at 237).

the

$4,043.80

owed

to

was

the

Butterfield

for

such

(Record at 237.)
3.

Peterson

Mortgage

primary

construction

lender with respect to the Property, which loan was secured by the
Trust Deed.
4.

(Record at 237.)
The owner executed a December 31, 1986 promissory

note in favor of Peterson Mortgage in the principal amount of
$155,000. 00, which note was secured by the Trust Deed of even date.
(Record at 106, 238).
5.

Construction work on the Property began on January

9, 1987, at 3:00 p.m., and Peterson Mortgage recorded the trust
Deed on January 9, 1987, at 4:38 p.m.
6.

(Record at 238) .

On June 18, 1987, Butterfield caused the Notice to

be recorded, which Notice had not been acknowledged.

(Record at

35, 238).
7.

On April 6, 1988, Butterfield

filed this action

seeking, among other relief, foreclosure of Peterson Mortgage's
interest in the Property.
8.

(Record at 2 38).

At no time pertinent hereto has Butterfield filed

for record a "lis pendens" as contemplated by § 38-L-ll U.C.A.
(1953) .

(Record at 134).
8

9.

On August

15,

1988 pursuant

to

a

non- judicial

foreclosure under the Trust Deed the Property was sold to Leon
Peterson, an individual.
10.

(Record at 238).

At all times pertinent hereto, Leon Peterson was

president of Peterson Mortgage.
11.

(Record at 238-39).

On January 13, 1989, Leon Peterson sold the property

to Peter H. Wright-Clark ("Wright-Clark-), who had no constructive
or actual notice of the pendency of this action.
12.

(Record at 239).

The date on which the last materials were furnished

by Butterfield to the property was April 10, 1987.

(Record at

134).
13.

Wright-Clark acquired the Property over 21 months

after materials were last delivered by Butterfield to the Property,
and over nine months after Butterfield was required to have filed
any notice of lis pendens which could have affected Wright-Clark's
interest in the Property.

(Record at 135).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Butterfield, as the one-time owner of a mechanic's

lien in the Property, has no rights to any proceeds from the sale
of the Property, because § Section 38-1-3 states that any lien held
by Butterfield could only attach to the Property rather than any
proceeds of sale of the Property.

Peterson Mortgage sold the

Property to Leon Peterson, and Leon Peterson sold the Property to

9

Wright-Clark, an innocent

third-party purchaser. Wright-Clark was

an innocent third-party purchaser because Butterfield failed to
preserve its rights in the Property as contemplated by § 38-1-3 by
failing to file a notice of lis pendens cis required by § 38-1-11.
Under

the

circumstances, the

foreclosure

of

any

interest

of

Peterson Mortgage in and to the Property as alleged in the Third
Claim for Relief was moot. At the same time, Butterfield no longer
had any cause of action against Peterson Mortgage because the Lien
had been extinguished when title passed to Wright-Clark. Upon such
extinction of the Lien, no security interest survived to attach to
any other real or personal property owned by Peterson Mortgage or
anyone else.

Therefore, the trial court erred in aLwarding any

unpled person judgment against Peterson Mortgage.
II.

Because the Notice was not acknowledged pursuant to

§ 57-3-1, U.C.A., in effect at the pertinent time, it was not
entitled to recordation and was void.

Accordingly, the Trust Deed

had priority over the Lien and the trial court erred by failing to
grant the Motion to Dismiss.

10

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE BDTTERFIELD FAILED TO TIMELY FILE A
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS AS CONTEMPLATED BY § 381-11, THE LIEN WAS EXTINGUISHED, AND UNDER §
38-1-3 BUTTERFIELD HAD NO LIEN ON ANY PROCEEDS
FROM THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY.
Section 38-1-11, U.C.A., provides in its entirety as
follows:
Actions to enforce the liens herein
provided for must be begun within twelve
months after the completion of the original
contract, or the suspension of work thereunder
for a period of thirty days.
Within the
twelve months herein mentioned the lien
claimant shall file for record with the county
recorder of each county in which the lien is
recorded a notice of the pendency of the
action, in the manner provided in actions
affecting the title or right to possession of
real property, or the lien shall be void,
except as to persons who have been made
parties to the action and persons having
actual knowledge of the commencement of the
action, and the burden of proof shall be upon
the lien claimant and those claiming under him
to show such actual knowledge. Nothing herein
contained shall be construed to impair or
affect the right of any person to whom a debt
may be due for any work done or materials
furnished to maintain a personal action to
recover the same. [Emphasis added.]
The Supreme Court has explained that "Mechanics' liens
are statutory creatures unknown to the common law. . . . Although
liens and pleadings arising under the statute will be liberally
construed to effect the desired object, compliance with the statute
is required before a party is entitled to the benefits created by

11

the statute."

AAA Fencing Co.

v. Raintree

Developmentr

714 P.2d

289, 291 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted).
The only relief pled by Butterfield against Peterson
Mortgage was.to foreclose the Mechanic's Lien, pursuant to which
claim Butterfield merely sought to foreclose Peterson Mortgage's
interest in the property.

However, by virtue of the trial court's

decision, Butterfield ended up "foreclosing" a wholly different
kind of lien, not a creature of statue or the common law.

At the

time of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Peterson Mortgage no
longer had any interest in the Property, the Property having been
conveyed

to

Wright-Clark as

of

January

13, 1989.

Because such

conveyance took place without any notice of lis pendens being of
record,

according

to

§

38-1-11,

U.C.A.,

the

Mechanic's

Lien

Butterfield sought to foreclose against Peterson Mortgage was void
because Wright-Clark
Peterson

Mortgage

had

had

no

no notice

of

this

action.

interest

in

the

Property

Because
and

the

Mechanic's Lien was void as to Wright-Clark, the foreclosure of any
interest of Peterson Mortgage in and to the Property was moot, and
Butterfield no longer had any cause of action against Peterson
Mortgage because the Mechanic's Lien did not exist.
Further, upon such extinction of the Mechanic's Lien, the
Mechanic's Lien did not survive to attach to any other real or
personal property of Peterson Mortgage. This is clear from § 38-13, U.C.A., which provides in its entirety as follows:

12

Contractors, subcontractors, and all
persons performing any services or furnishing
or renting any materials or equipment used in
the construction, alteration, or improvement
of any building or structure or improvement to
any premises in any manner and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have
furnished
designs,
plats,
plans, maps,
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost,
surveys or superintendence, or who have
rendered other like professional service, or
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the
Property upon or concerning which they have
rendered
service,
performed
labor,
or
furnished or rented materials or ..equipment for
the value of the service rendered, labor
performed, or materials or equipment furnished
or rented by each respectively, whether at the
instance of the owner or of any other person
acting by his authority as agent, contractor,
or otherwise. This lien shall attach only to
such interest as the owner may have in the
Property. [Emphasis added.]
The foregoing section clearly provides that the statutorily created
Mechanic's Lien attached only to an interest in the
itself, which
Butterfield

is

property

the real property upon or concerning

"furnished

or

rented

materials

or

which

equipment."

Butterfield did not render service, perform labor or furnish or
rent materials or equipment upon or concerning the proceeds from
any sale of the Property.

In other words, other than the Property,

the Mechanic ' s Lien did not attach to any real or personal property
owned by anyone.
We know of no case, when confronted with

the clear

language of the last sentence of our § 38-1-3, that holds that a
mechanic's lien on real property is somehow converted to a lien on
the proceeds of any sale of such real property.
13

Whatever lien

Butterfield had, and according to § 38-1-3 it was a lien only in
and to the owner's interest in the Property, was lost when the
Property was conveyed to the innocent third-part purchaser and
Butterfield had not filed any notice of lis pendens with respect to
this action.

Clearly, even if we resort to ignoring the clear

language of § 38-1-3 in favor of a "balancing of equities," which
Butterfield

urged

before the trial court,

such

"balancing

of

equities" favors Peterson Mortgage for the simple reason that
Butterfield could have protected itself fully by filing the notice
of lis pendens contemplated by § 38-1-11.

Having failed to do so,

how can Butterfield now be heard to say that the risk of loss
should be born by Peterson Mortgage, whose only mistake was that it
failed to record its Trust Deed until an hour and 38 minutes after
work had commenced on the Property, On the other hand, Butterfield
had until April 10, 1989, or approximately 15 months later, to
protect its interest in the Property.

Butterfield failed to do so

by the simple expedient of routinely filing a notice of lis pendens
with respect to this action.
Therefore,

the

trial

court

Butterfield's Motion for Summary Judgment.

14

erred

in

granting

POINT II
A NOTICE OF MECHANIC'S LIEN NOT PROPERLY
ACKNOWLEDGED PURSUANT TO S 57-3-1, IN EFFECT
AT THE PERTINENT TIME, DID NOT PERFECT THE
MECHANIC'S LIEN.
A.

Because the Notice was not acknowledged.
entitled to recordation and was void.
Section 57-3-1, U.C.A., provides

it was not

in its entirety as

follows:
-A certificate of the acknowledgement of
any conveyance, or of the proof of the
execution thereof as provided in this title,
signed and certified by the officer taking the
same as provided in this title, shall entitle
such conveyance, with the certificate or
certificates aforesaid, to be recorded in the
office of the recorder of the county in which
the real estate is situated.
The Notice was not acknowledged as required by § 57-3-1.
an acknowledgment, a recording is void and of no effect.

Lacking
Doris

Trust Company v. Guermbach, 103 Utah 120, 133 P.2d 1003 (1943); see
also Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 826 (Utah
App. 1989); General Glass Corp. v. Mast Const. Co., 766 P.2d 429
(Utah

App.

1988)

(general

requirements

of

acknowledgement);

Mickelsen v. Craiqco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561 (Utah 1989) (outlining
what constitutes compliance with statute).
Acknowledgments

are

dispensed with when convenient.

not

mere

technicalities,

to

be

As stated by the Supreme Court of

Idaho:
We believe that the manifest intent of the
legislature in requiring a notary public to
execute a certificate of acknowledgment is to
15

provide protection against the recording of
false instruments. The sine qua non of this
statutory requirement is the involvement of
the notary, a public officer in a position of
public trust.
Benjamin Franklin Savings & Loan Association v. New Concept Realty
and Development, Inc., 107 Idaho 711, 692 P.2d 355 (1984), quoting
Farm Bureau Finance Company, Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 605
P.2d 509 (1980).
B.

The 1989 amendment to the Mechanic's Lien statute did not
amend § 57-3-1, which requires an acknowledgment prior to
recording and thus the Mechanic's Lien was not perfected.
The

1989

unaccompanied by

amendment

to

§

38-1-7, validating

notices

acknowledgements filed between April 29,

1985,

through April 24, 1989, did not amend the Utah Recording Act at §
57-3-1 or modify its requirements.

Such amendment, House Bill 62,

dealt only with U.C.A. § 38-1-7 —

the Mechanic's Lien statute.

When the Notice was recorded by Butterfield, the recording statute
provided

that

an

acknowledgment,

essential for a valid recording.

or

certificate

thereof,

was

Inasmuch as House Bill 62 did not

specifically exempt mechanic's liens from the requirements of the
Recording Act, an acknowledgment is still an essential prerequisite
to recordation.

Thus, the Notice was invalidly recorded and must

be treated as a nullity for failure to comply with Utah law.

Since

the Notice was void as a matter of law, the Notice failed to timely
perfect the Mechanic's Lien as required by § 3 8-1-7.
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CONCLUSION
Butter field has no lien upon or any other rights in
Peterson Mortgage's proceeds of the sale of the Property, nor did
Butterfield

have

a

perfected

lien

Therefore, the trial court erred by:

on

the

Property

itself.

(1) granting the Motion for

Summary Judgment; and (2) failing to grant the Motion to Dismiss.
Accordingly, the Order and Judgment should be reversed and the case
remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss this
action as to Peterson Mortgage and award Peterson Mortgage its
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of October, 1990.

James ft. Thompson
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
\JLT\P\104
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ADDENDUM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
DECISION —

dated June 28, 1989

MEMORANDUM DECISION —

dated March 1, 1990

MEMORANDUM DECISION —

dated June 15, 1990

ORDER AND JUDGMENT —

dated July 12, 1990
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant were served this 26th day of October,
1990 by mailing the same by first-class, United States mail,
postage prepaid, to:
David K. Broadbent (#0442)
Thomas M. Melton (#4999)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PETERSEN MORTGAGE INC.
JOHN L. McCLOY dba McCLOY
CONSTRUCTION, JAMES A.
ARROWSMITH, GAYLE Z. ARROWSMITH
CORPORATION, IDEAL CONCRETE
CORPORATION, REID'S CONCRETE
SERVICE, INC., DAVIS BROS.
CABINET MAKERS, INC., and JOHN
DOE I,

D E C I S I O N
C i v i l N o . 8 8 3 0 0 3 8 2 5 CV

Defendants.

This is a motion to dismiss by defendant Petersen
Mortgage Inc.

The critical issue in this matter is the

authority of the County Recorder to receive a document for
recording that has not been acknowledged.
The plaintiff filed a notice to claim a lien in accord
with the required procedures (32-1-7 UCA 1953) on June 17,
1987 •

Petersen claims that at the time of filing, all

documents that affected real property were required to be
acknowledged (57-2-1 UCA 1953, repealed on July 1, 1988) to be
received for recordation by the County Recorder (57-3-1 UCA
1953) ,

That without an acknowledgment the document in

question should not have been received by the recorders
office, and that the recorder acted ultra vires, thus making
the notice of lien void and of no legal effect.

A review of the statutory authority of the County
Recorder (Section 17-21-et seq. UCA 1953) , finds no
prohibiting language that limits the receiving of
non-acknowledged documents.

Section 57-3-1 UCA 1953 as

amended bestows a right to record a conveyance or document if
acknowledged but does not directly or by implication prohibit
the recording of an unacknowledged document (Section 57-3-3
UCA, 1953 limits the effect of a document that is not recorded
according to Title 57 to subsequent purchasers, e t c )
The 1988 Legislature enacted Section 57-4a-2 UCA 1953,
which dictated that the contents of a recorded document
imparted notice regardless of an omission of an
acknowledgment.

This recent amendment to the code appears to

allow the pratical effect of recording even though the
document does not meet the full statutory requirements.

This

seems to satisfy the over-riding purpose of Section 38-1-7 UCA
1953 which is to notify all interested parties in the named
property of an intention to perfect a lien.
The court concludes that the county recorder did not
commit an ultra vires act when it received and recorded
plaintiff's notice of the intention to claim a lien, and that
Section 57-4a-2 UCA, 1953 ratified the effectiveness of that
notice.

The present action is a continuation of the

requirements to establish the lien rights of the plaintiff in
the subject property.

The action against the defendant is

essential to determine the priority rights of all the parties
in the real estate in question
Therefore/ the court denies defendants motion to
dismiss and allows 10 days for the defendant to file its
answer.
Dated this

day of June, 1989.

Paul G. Grant /
Third Circuit Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Decision was mailed, postage, prepaid to Thomas M.
Melton, Attorney at Law, City Centre I, Suite 900, 175 E 400
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 and Kent B. Linebaugh,
Attorney at Law, 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111 this off

day of June, 1989,
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

BUTTERFIELD LUMBER,

]

Plaintiff,

vs.
PETERSON MORTGAGE CORP.

])

MEMORANDUM DECISION

;)

Case No. 883003825 CV

]

Defendant.

Plaintiff has moved the Court to determine the legal
liability of a specific defendant, Peterson Mortgage CompanyThe plaintiff, Butterfield Lumber, supplied building materials
for the construction of a private residence and perfected a
mechanics lien on the property when the owner and contractor
failed to pay for the materials.

The defendant, Peterson

Mortgage, is the primary lender whose financial interest is
protected by a trust deedThe owner has filed for bankruptcy and the general
contractor (who has since passed away) are defendants in this
action.

This motion does not ask for a determination as to

their liability.
The plaintiff requests that the court require defendant
Peterson Mortgage Corporation to pay over to it the amount
claimed in the notice of lien ($4,240.73) because its lien has
priority over the defendants trust deed.

93"?

Defendant Peterson moves the court for an order
dismissing Plaintttiffs "in rem" action against it on the
grounds that plaintiff failed to file a lis pendens within the
time required by law (31-1-11 IKC.A* 1953) , therefore
forfeiting its rights in the property and any claim against
Petersen.
As between these two parties the following facts appear
to be undisputed.
The owners of the property executed a promissory note
secured by a trust deed payable to Petersen on December 31,
1986.

Construction work began on a new residence on the

property on January 9, 1987 at 3:00 p.m, 1953, - Peterson filed
its trust deed with the recorders office on January 9, 1987 at
4:38 p.m.

Plaintiff issued its Notice of Lien within the

statutory time as required by Section 38-1-7 U.C.A. 1953, by
filing a notice of lien with the County Recorders office on
June 18, 1987 and mailing a copy of the notice to the
registered owners on the 24th of June, 1987.

This action was

commenced in April, 1988 and defendant Petersen was served on
April 9, 1988.
On April 11, 1988 the trustee of the trust deed gave
notice of default and election to sell to all parties of
record.

After soliciting bids and conducting a public sale

the trustee conveyed the property to Leon Petersen as an
individual in August 1988.

Leon Peterson is president and

-2-
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registered agent of the defendant, Peterson Mortgage Corp,
Both parties agree that Peterson Mortgage and Leon Peterson,
had actual notice of plaintifffs claim and lien,

Peterson

does not dispute the amount of the debt claimed by Plaintiff,
and both parties agree that this is an "in rem" action not an
"in personam" claim as to this specific defendant.
On January 13, 1989 Leon Peterson sold the property to
the present owner, Peter H. Wright-Clark, who had no
constructive or actual notice of this action.
The parties to this motion agree that Plaintiff may not
foreclose on the real property because of the failure to file
a lis pendens as required by Section 38-1-11 U.C.A. 1953 nor
may it proceed against the present owner.
A careful review of Utah cases reveals that this case
presents a novel issue.

The question that is controlling is;

"Does a lienholder have rights in the proceeds of a trust deed
sale after the lienor has failed to preserve its "in rem"
rights in the specific property by failing to file a "lis
pendens"?"
The applicable parts of the mechanics lien statute are
as follows:

-3-
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. •. All persons .. • furnishing • .. any materials • . .
used in the construction •. • of any building •. . shall
have a lien upon the property upon ... which they have
. • • furnished ... materials • • • for the value of the ...
materials ... furnished •••by each respectively,
whether at the instance of the owner or any other person
acting by his authority as ... contractor •.. This lien
shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have
in the property (Section 38- 1- 3 U.C.A. 1953) .
. • • Within the twelve months . .. the lien claimant shall
file for record ... a notice of the pendency of the
action ... or the lien shall be void, except as to
persons who have been made parties to the action and
persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of
the action . . . (Section 38-1-11 U.C.A. 1953) .
It is plaintiff's position (a) that past Utah Supreme
Court decisions require that a liberal interpretation must be
given the mechanics' lien statute to protect matericilmen in
their unpaid claims, -(b) that defendant had actual knowledge
of plaintiffs claim and is therefore not absolved of liability
even if plaintiff failed to file a lis pendens, and (c) that
equity gives the plaintiff the right to transfer its lien to
the proceeds of the sale of the property.
Defendant counters with the argument (a) that plaintiff
must strictly follow the statutes if it wishes to preserve its
claim; (b) that defendant has no personal liability to
plaintiff; and (c) that the case before the court is an action
to foreclose a lien, the lien no longer exists and is void
therefore this action should be dismissed as to this
particular defendant.
Basically the court must decide which of the two parties
shall suffer the loss resulting from another parties failure
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to pay a contractual obligation.

This court thinks that

plaintifffs position better reflects the purpose of the law
and therefore rules that plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment should be granted.
The Utah Supreme Court takes a rather strong position
that the purpose of the mechanics1 lien statute is to protect
those lienors who have added directly to the value of the
property by furnishing materials upon it.

Stanton

Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah2d 184, 341 P2d 207 (1959),
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241
(1917) . Also that such claims should not be defeated by legal
technicalities or nice distinctions.

Park City Meat Company

v. Comstock Silver Mining Company, 36 Utah 145, 103 P2d 254
(1909).
The public purpose for the requirement of filing a lis
pendens is to give notice to subsequent purchasers who lack
actual notice, Smith v. Faris-Kesl Const. Co., 150 P. 25
(Idaho 1915).

In Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company v.

Professional United World Travel Association, Inc,,592 P.2d
586 (Utah 1979) the court preserved a foreclosure action on
the liened property after it had been sold at a trust deed
sale, because the president of the acquiring corporation was
also president of the conveying corporation.

Thus the court

continued the protection of the lien law even when a lis

-5-

^ \

pendens had not been filed because the court ruled that the
acquiring corporation had notice of the lien and came within
the exception stated in Section 38-1-11*
To adopt Defendants position that plaintifffs action is
now void because the lien does not exist and defendant has no
personal liability to plaintiff would require a very strict
application of the mechanics lien statute.

One would be

required to ignore the exception contained in section 38-1-11
that declares "except as to persons who have been made parties
to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the
commencement of the action".

Such an interpretation is not in

tune with the previous rulings on the law.
In this case the defendant clearly had actual notice of
plaintiff's lien when it sold the specific property to the
present owner,

Leon Peterson was in the best position to set

the sale price and to take into account the potential loss to
both Petersen and plaintiff.

Plaintiff has a right to have

its claim satisfied from the proceeds of the sale to the
present owner,
"It is well understood that when a person has a
lien on land , , . and the holder of the legal
title disposes of it to one who is an innocent
purchaser for value and protected against such
lien, the lienholder has the right in equity to
have the court transfer his lien to what is
received as the consideration for the sale . . . "
Morgan Plan Co., Inc v. Bruce, 2 66 Ala. 49 4; 9 7
So.2d 805 (1957).
-6-
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Plaintiff established a position of priority when work
was commenced on the property before defendant filed its trust
deed (see Section 38-1-5 U.C.A. 1953).

Equity dictates that

the priority continues even though the real property has been
sold.

Judgment to issue for plaintiff in the sum of $4,240.73

plus interest from January 13, 1989 (the date of sale to the
present owner) and costs including a reasonable attorneys fee
(limited to legal services required as to the issues between
these parties) .
DATED this

/,

day of inarch, 1990.

Paul G, Gr$nt i
Third Circuit Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of March, 1990, I
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to the folllowing:
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
David K. Broadbent, Esq,
Thomas M. Melton, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
Kent B. Linebaugh
Attorney for Defendants
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, I N C , ,
Plaintiff,
vs.

JON L. McCLOY, dba McCLOY
CONSTRUCTION, JAMES A. ARROWSMITH,
PETERSON MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
IDEAL CONCRETE CORPORATION,
REID f S CONCRETE SERVICE, INC.,
DAVIS BROTHERS CABINETMAKERS,
INC., AND JOHN DOE I,
Defendants.

Defendant, Peterson Mortgage Corporation has objected to
plaintiff's proposed order and summary judgment.
Three points of defendants objections are well taken.
First - Amount of lien.

These two parties are creditors

of a bankrupt owner and a deceased contractor.

The defendant

had no use of plaintiff's materials until such time as it
foreclosed on its Trust Deed and resold the property to a
third party.

Defendant then became the constructive trustee

of plaintiff's proceeds.

This point was stated but not

explained in the courts memorandum decision indicating that
interest was to be allowed after January 13, 1990.

The lien

amount should be entered in the amount of $4,04 3.80.
Second - Duplication of time and effort.

There are 16

incidents cited in counsels affidavit of attorney's fees

covering inter-office conferences.
legal assistant worked on the case.

Three attorneys and one
That such communication

is essential and necessary within a large firm is unquestioned
for the smooth operation of the firm.

But those are internal

matters which do not necessarily go to the question of what is
a reasonable attorney's fee for the work required in any given
case.

Further, the nurturing of junior members of a firm by

senior members should be an internal matter not a cost
chargeable as a reasonable attorney's fee.

The court will

therefore require a reduction of*the fee in the sum of $350.00.
Third - Preparation for oral argument.

The court notes

that almost $2,100.00 in fees were generated by the required
research and preparation of written documents necessary to
prosecute the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment . The
court finds that 4 hours would be a reasonable time to
assimilate that material and work product in preparation for
oral argument plus an hour for court argument for a total of 5
hours at $125*00 per hour.

In counsels affidavit of

attorney's fees there are five entries reflecting such
preparation costs, i.e., September 11, 1989, October 3, 1989,
October 13, 1989, November 1, 1989, and November 2, L989, for
a total sum of $1,188.75. As above indicated this sum should
be reduced to $625.00. Further, it was clearly established
that defendants counsel did not receive notice of the first
hearing date.

Inasmuch as plaintiff requested oral argument

on the motion, defendant should not be required to bear the

burden of the expense of plaintiff's counsel attending when
not receiving notice of the hearing date.

But of course the

time spend for preparation would still be useful at a
subsequent hearing.

Attorney's fees may therefore be allowed

in the sum of $3,747.60.
The finding of fact, conclusions of law and judgment
should-be submitted in conformity to this decision.
Dated this

/ !>

day
//

Paul G. Grant
Third Circuit Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision was mailed, postage prepaid to
the below mentioned this

day of May, 199 0.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
David K. Broadbent
Thomas M. Melton
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 900
17 5 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
Kent B. Linebaugh
Attorney for Defendants
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
David K. Broadbent (0442)
Thomas M. Melton (4999)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, INC.,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs,
JON L . McCLOY, d / b / a McCLOY
CONSTRUCTION, JAMES A .
ARROWSMITH, GAYLE Z . ARROWSMITH,
PETERSON MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
IDEAL CONCRETE CORPORATION,
R E I D ' S CONCRETE S E R V I C E , I N C . ,
DAVIS BROTHERS CABINETMAKERS,
I N C . , a n d JOHN DOE I ,

'Civil

No.

Judge

883003825CV

Paul

Grant

Defendants.

On March 1, 1990, the Court issued its Memorandum
Decision on plaintiff Butterfield Lumber, Ir.c.'s Motion for
Summary Judgment.

On June 15, 1990, the Court issued its

Memoranajm Decision clarifying its prior decision and
establishing the terms of the order and judgment in the
above-captioned case.
PRINCE, YEATES
4 Q6LOZAHLER
U t y Centra J, Suite 000
1 ft East Fourth South
Salt L*k« a t y
U U h 84111
(801)524-1000

Decisions,

In accordance with those Memorandum

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Summary Judgment Motion of Plaintiff Butterfield Lumber, Inc.,
is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the
premises aforesaid,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Butterfield
Lumber recover from defendant Peterson Mortgage Corporation the
following sums and amounts:
(a)

$4,043.80, the amount of plaintiff's mechanic's

(b)

$569.80, interest at the statutory rate of 10%,

lien;

from January 29, 1989, through June 30, 1990, plus per diem
interest at the rate of $1.10 per day until the date of
Judgment;
(c)

$3,747.60, attorneys1 fees as set forth in the

Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees submitted with the proposed order
and judgment and as set forth in the Court's Memorandum
Decision dated June 15, 1990;
(d)

Interest on all sums due and owing after the date

of judgment at the statutory rate until paid;
(e)

The judgment shall be augmented in the amount of

reasonable costs and attorneys' fees expended in collecting
said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established
by affidavit.
PRINCE, YEATES
4 QELOZAHLER
City Centre t. Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City
Utah 84111
(801)524-1000
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DATED

tM.

V

day of July, 1990
BY THE C^URT:

Paul G. Grant
District Court/Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that, on the

day of July, 1990,

I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Order and Judgment co the following:
David K. Broadbent, Esq.
Thomas M. Helton, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Kent B. Linebaugh, Esq.
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
370 East South Temple, £400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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PRINCE, YEATES
A QELOZAHLER
C«tyOntr»| t Sutt«900
175 East Fourth South
S*« U k e CUy
Utah 84111
(001)524.1000
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